Free Will

The Quid on Free Will 

Book Author: Sam Harris 

Preview 

Are human beings the sole authors of their thoughts and actions? Is human behaviour freely-willed or subject to determinism by forces beyond our control? If determinism is true, what does that bode for human agency and dignity and the problem of holding people morally responsible? Sam Harris in his book Free Will, published in 2012, takes up these questions, and through concise, eloquent and accessible philosophical arguments, establishes the case for determinism. 

About the Author: 

Samuel Benjamin Harris (1967- ) is an American author, philosopher, and neuroscientist. He is the author of several bestselling books and the winner of the 2005 PEN Award for Nonfiction. Using a lucid and often humorous framework, Harris defends his philosophical outlook in favour of determinism. He combines neuroscience and psychology and with great intellectual panache offers convincing arguments substantiated by commonplace and relatable examples.  

The Big Idea: There is no such thing as free will! 

This book goes beyond the theological debate of free will and divine determinism to examine the ramifications of relinquishing the illusion of free will in the human world, and what it bodes for systems of law and morality. It examines major philosophical arguments in favour of free will and refutes them through the use of engaging everyday examples. The book encourages introspection. The readers stand to gain valuable insights about the origin of human behaviour. The text implies the necessity of a renewed approach towards understanding criminal behaviour and making our legal systems more nuanced and humanitarian. 

In this book, you will discover: 

• What free will entails and what makes it indispensable to legal and moral systems necessary for maintaining order in human society. 

• How free will is merely an illusion in a deterministic universe. 

• The philosophical approaches to the free will, determinism, and moral responsibility debate, and the conflicting standpoints of the compatibilists and the incompatibilists. 

• How a fatalistic outlook can be avoided while embracing determinism. 

• How moral responsibility and systems of justice can be organized around determinism. 

 

What does it mean to possess Free Will? 

The concept of free will demands that individuals be independent creators of their thoughts and actions; in this capacity, it is central to the systems of law and morality, to human relationships, to human response to wrongdoing and achievements. If free will proves to be an illusion, humans would be mere puppets in the hands of physical laws or their neural system.  

Criminals could not be held accountable or punished; neither would people deserve credit for their successes and achievements. However, the illusory nature of free will becomes evident when one considers the nuances of criminal law and attributing moral responsibility. A criminal who has committed heinous acts must be unequivocally condemned; however, often a history of childhood trauma and psychological abuse seems to have moulded a person to such an extent that in a given circumstance, he or she could not have acted differently.  

To possess free will implies that a different course of action than the one undertaken be possible under identical circumstances, and that humans be conscious authors of their thoughts and actions. Since chance and luck decisively influence a person's genetic makeup and life experiences, they dictate a single course of action that cannot be evaded. The background causes behind our conscious thoughts and actions are mysterious and beyond our control. 

Are we really in control? 

Even the most inconsequential of our daily activities originate through neuropsychological events that we do not have access to or influence over. The intention to perform a particular action merely appears in human consciousness, it does not originate there, and its causes are obscure.  

Physiological experiments have refuted the possibility of free will by proving that analysing neural patterns in a person's brain can predict his or her actions, even before a conscious decision has been made. Our brain, therefore, determines decisions and thoughts prior to and independent of our conscious awareness. In this scenario, mental states arise spontaneously and free from our control, rendering the question of freedom, moot. Even if the driving force behind human behaviour were an immaterial soul, its unconscious operations would deny people even the knowledge of what they are going to do in the next moment, thereby refuting the possibility of free will. This tendency is particularly evident in cases wherein we feel incapable of feeling or doing as we desire. However, free will is still absent even when we feel emboldened to act in tandem with our desires.  

The brain or the soul that allows us to restrain from, or not even consider committing a murder, is as inexplicable as the one that leads us to it. Even our voluntary actions are governed by intentions whose origins or nature remain obscure. To have free will is to be entirely responsible for, to have awareness about and control over the influences that determine neural events which further influence one's thoughts and thereby, actions. 

The Compatibilist Argument

Centuries of debate over the question of free will and determinism has given rise to three primary positions. The incompatibilists argue that free will cannot coexist with determinism; the determinists uphold that free will is an illusion, and in contrast, the libertarians argue that human agency transcends physical causation. Compatibilists however, deny the exclusivist positions of the former, suggesting that we exercise free will when we act in conformity to our desires without external or internal compulsions. However, neuropsychological causes are always active in determining one's actions, precluding the possibility of behaving any differently than ordained by the stream of causes that govern our conscious decisions.  

A person will act as he or she is wired; no other way would occur to their imagination. Moreover, competing, often problematic or mutually incompatible, desires and aspirations govern people. One craves a cigarette while earnestly desirous to quit smoking. Wherein lies the free will when one impulse inexplicably triumphs over another? The compatibilist version of free will appears to be one not worth having; it does not demand consciousness of, or control over our mental lives, or the causes that produce our desires in the first place. Our freedom remains that of a puppet, who loves its strings. 

Compatibilists confuse matters by insisting that despite our lack of control or consciousness about our mental states that influence our desires, thoughts, and actions, the latter nevertheless remain our thoughts and actions and this accounts for free will. However, this understanding of free will cannot be reconciled with the pragmatic concerns of attributing agency and moral responsibility.  

If we are free agents unconscious of what motivates our thoughts and behaviour, how are we morally responsible for that which we cannot control? Free will in tandem with moral responsibility is that which arouses the subjective feeling of conscious agency, the lived experience that tells us that we are the authors of everything we think and do, and therefore, responsible for it. In this sense, one is claiming just as much freedom as a person who has been hypnotized to perform a particular action, yet feels completely free and responsible in obeying. 

Does Free Will lie in Chance and Indeterminism?  

Commonsensical notions of individual agency and moral responsibility require that our actions must not be entirely predictable based on biology or social conditioning or other uncontrollable background causes. Scientific attempts at reconciling this requirement with free will have taken recourse to quantum indeterminacy.  

Certain processes in the brain occur randomly by chance and are not determined by external causes; free will must lie in this randomness. However, spontaneous and random "neurological ambushes" cannot make for free will. Our thoughts, desires, and actions necessarily follow cause-and-effect patterns of behaviour. If determinism is true, a person's future actions are predictable. If indeterminism is true, one is not responsible for chance occurrences of the future course of events. Neither truth can support free will conducive to moral responsibility. 

 

 

Determinism is not Fatalism

Abandoning the illusion of freewill does not necessitate an abandonment of the distinction between consciously deliberated voluntary actions and accidental or involuntary ones. Moral and legal concerns rely on the former and can be sustained even without free will. To say that premeditated and voluntary actions are not free is not to assert that they are inconsequential. 

 If one suffers from pain and decides, upon deliberation, to seek physical therapy, the conscious decision remains significant even when one is unaware of what created the pain or the thoughts that lead one to a remedy. Similarly, the general misconception that accepting determinism leads to fatalism can be refuted by asserting that human choice retains as much importance as the proponents of freewill attribute to it.  

Discipline and serious effort can make a tremendous difference even when one is not aware of the processes that lead to them. Efforts that appear doomed to failure even when accompanied by willpower or desire are often easily accomplished later. One tends to attribute this dramatic transformation to the decisive influence of an idea or an event; even as the creation or appearance or the extent of the power of that idea or event cannot be explained, the efforts in themselves remain significant. One's decision to do what they decide is possible even when what they decide remains beyond their comprehension or control. 

The existentialist belief that humans are free to interpret the meaning of their lives does not imply free will either. It merely means that one can choose between different perspectives on life that will have different consequences; the choice itself is determined by prior experiences that serve as background causes. What thoughts we have next or what decisions we take in the next moment are mysteries beyond our control governed by our social conditions, life experiences, genetic makeup or mental and physical development–things that we did not choose would determine what we will choose. However, this is not to deny the importance of planning for the future by weighing different circumstances or competing desires; it is only to acknowledge that we cannot know or control the sources of our behaviour. 

What does it bode for Moral Responsibility and Legal Action? 

Does the absence of free will preclude moral responsibility or legal action? While a conscious intention to harm must be condemned, moral liability for an act must be judged while considering the perpetrator's personality, physical and psychological state, prior offenses, and decisive motives. A conscious planning to harm differs from a crime of passion; the former reveals the general complexion of the perpetrator's brain and indicates the degree of threat he or she poses and therefore, the need for incarceration.  

Moral condemnation must be softened, however, in a case where the perpetrator appears to be a victim of biology, or forces beyond his or her control. The illusion of free will, of holding people entirely responsible for their acts, finds sustenance in the human propensity towards vengeance and retribution against acts of injustice. Perceptivity to causes governing an action can lead to compassion and forgiveness, even while enforcing punishment under pragmatic concerns of security and rehabilitation. 

Final Summary

We hope you enjoyed this quid on Free Will. The notion that free will is a necessary illusion to attribute moral responsibility, to avoid fatalism, or to live a fulfilling life is a misplaced one. It is certainly advisable to look at the bigger picture, and account for pragmatic considerations like reacting in self-defense when attacked, rather than looking for causes behind how one reacts. However, acknowledging the absence of free will has its benefits. It makes one less prone to feeling entitled, negative thoughts and fears appear temporary and inconsequential, and one is awakened to the potential for change. Moreover, an enhanced sensitivity to the causes of one's behaviour can provide one a greater control over life. 

Stand out Sections: 

·    The introduction offers an engaging account of the philosophical debates surrounding free will and determinism. It introduces the readers to the problem of moral responsibility by discussing a crime and its perpetrators in detail and capitalizing on the expected pattern of the reader's moral intuitions. 

·    The sections entitled 'Might the Truth be Bad for us?' and 'Moral Responsibility' provide nuanced and valuable insights for individual moral responses as well as the criminal justice system. The latter emphasizes the need to acknowledge the absence of free will to adopt a more considerate and humanitarian legal system that takes into account background causes motivating an action. 

·    Harris concludes delightfully by performing an experiment in free will and considering his act of writing in itself, as governed by unconscious impulses that he cannot fathom.